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In an observation that is at least as well known for the 
dissension it has aroused as for its usefulness in helping us to 
understand a central problem in modern literature, T. S. Eliot spoke 
of the dissociation of sensibility, the separation of thought and 
feeling, that has taken place in poets since (and including) Hilton. 
Frank Kermode has noted the problems with Mr. Eliot's assumptions 
about history but generally concurs with Mr. Eliot's analysis and 
points to the modern interest in the j.mage as a means of bridging the 
gap between feelings and ideas or experience. I too am very interested 
in this problem which I believe is a factor in the relationships between 
earlier and later poets. And I find it helpful to bring to bear the 
findings of classical and modern psychoanalysis on any such dissociation. 
Having said this, and before going further, I feel I should say what 
this paper is not as well as what it is. It is not an attempt to 
analyse the personalities of any poets -- Shelley or Yeats, in this 
case. For this reason I don't think it is necessary to bring in 
extensive biographical support; though I hope that you will not find 
my arguments inconsistent with the personal development of either poet. 
What I would like is to contribute to an understanding of what I think 
is perhaps the single most important question about Romantic and 
later poetry, that is, what is the relationship between emotion and 
experience as the poets understand it? And I bring in psychoanalysis 
not to contradict that understanding, but for two especial reasons: 
first, that the relation of affect to idea or experience lies 
at the heart of psychoanalysis as both theory and therapy, and 
second, that the terms of psychoanalysis may well be enriched by 
being brought into relation with the poems. 
Once the factual basis of one poet's influence upon 
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another has been established, it seems inevitable that a more-or-
less oedipal paradigm for the form of the influence will be proposed. 
This has of course occurred in the last few years, and has resulted 
in some very rich and suggestive readings of Romantic and later poetry. 
You are all familiar with the basic structure of such readings: the 
precursor or parental poet by his achievement threatens the later 
poet, whose work we can view in terms of oedipal victory or defeat. 
Without detracting from the usefulness to literary criticism of this 
approach, I would like to suggest that the issue of oedipal conflict 
is not so c1earcut as this; that a successful passage through the 
oedipal stage is dependent upon the child's earlier developmental 
experiences; and that the actual relationship between two poets 
may well depend upon developmentally earlier and psychologically more 
basic experiences. At least I feel this to be true of Shelley and 
Yeats. 
I'll begin, then, with a brief consideration of the way in which 
the individual responds to trauma. This is one of the most basic 
situations that psychoanalysis has illuminated. Here is Freud, 
writing in 1938, near the end of his career, of the mechanism of 
dissociation or splitting: "I find myself for a moment," Freud hegins, 
"in the interesting position of not knowing whether what I have to 
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say should be regarded as something long familiar and obvious or 
as something entirely new and puzzling." Freud was "inclined to 
think the latter,,,l and analysts reading "The Splitting of the Ego 
in the Process of Defence" would doubtless agree, for the 
simultaneous knowing and not knowing, without repression, is a 
new idea in Freud. But the reason for Freud's momentary hesitation 
is important. In fact the term "splitting" (spaltung) has a long 
history in Freud's writing -- and can be found in the work of Janet 
as well. In 1894, in his seminal paper, "The Neuropsychoses of 
Defence," Freud suggested that the etiology of both hysteria and 
obsessional neuroses included a defensive "splitting of consciousness" 
in the face of a psychic trauma. "For these patients whom I 
analyzed had enjoyed good mental health up to the moment at which 
an occurrence of incompatibility took place in their ideational life 
that is to say, until their ego was faced with an experience, an idea 
or a feeling which aroused such a distressing affect that the subject 
decided to forget about it because he had no confidence in his power 
to resolve the contradiction between the incompatible idea and his 
ego by means of thought-activity.,,2 
You can see that the idea of the unconscious still lay before 
Freud. But the basic mechanisms of the formation of symptoms in 
hysteria and obsessional neurosis remains the same. "Both the 
memory-trace and the affect which is attached to the idea are there 
once and for all and cannot be eradicated. But it amounts to an 
approximate fulfillment of the task if the ego succeeds in turning 
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this powerful idea into a weak one, in robbing it of the affect. 
In hysteria the affect is converted to a somatic symptom, in 
obsessional neurosis it is attached to a substitute idea (which then 
becomes the well known obsessional idea). What matters for students 
of literature is that Freud from the beginning proposes as the basis 
for the onset of neurotic illness a splitting of affect or emotion 
from idea or experience. Probably at this point you will think of 
the Romantic poets' interest in internal division: I too would like 
to consider this, but first it might be useful to follow a bit further 
the development of the concept of splitting in psychoanalysis. 
As you are probably aware, Freud's original and necessary 
emphasis on the unconscious and on drives yielded some importance to 
the ego when his structural theory was announced in 1923. The work 
of Anna Freud, Hartmann and others strengthened this movement, in 
which the individual was still more-or-less considered in isolation, 
though now from the point of view of the vicissitudes of the ego. 
With the announcement, in 1941, that "the ultimate goal of libido 
is the object,,,4 Fairbairn announced a movement in British psycho-
analysis toward a theory of development based upon object-relationships. 
We develop because of and under the influence of our relationships 
with significant people. Our drives toward sexuality or aggression 
are actually drives toward relationships without which we cannot 
develop. These are vitally important additions to psychoanalysis, 
and find empirical support in the work of Mahler. Moreover, the 
work of Heinz Kohut and others in Chicago, which constitutes a 
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psychoanalytic psychology of the self, shares a major premise with 
the object-relations analysts: both lnodels, like Freud's, assume 
that the fundamental factor in development is a form of splitting. 
Let us recall that Freud posited a trauma that forced the individual 
to split off emotion from the experience as a way of neutralizing it. 
The consequence would be a symptom -- as in the cases of hysteria 
and obsessional neurosis. For the object-relations people, the 
trauma is a longer process of early childhood experience, and what 
is split off is not just feeling, but a feelingful self, a primary 
and natural ego. The consequence here is not only an hysterical or 
obsessional symptom, which may indeed be present as an overlay, but 
a regression of this feelingful or affective ego, and a withdrawal 
of this part of the self to the safety of interiority. "The split 
in question," Fairbairn insists, "is fundamentally a split in the 
ego. What manifests itself on the surface as a divorce between 
thought and feeling must accordingly be construed as the reflection 
of a split between (1) a more superficial part of the ego representing 
its higher levels and including the conscious, and (2) a deeper part 
of the ego representing its lower levels and including those elements 
which are most highly endowed with libido and are hence the source 
of affect."S 
It is important to keep in mind that we are discussing a 
range of reactions of this type, from observable tendencies to 
withdraw to pathological regression: we are not doing a full 
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differential diagnosis of Shelley or Yeats. With this disclaimer, 
one or two points may nevertheless be underlined. The split-off 
part of the self, which is protected at the cost of deep inwardness, 
retains the libidinal or affective qualities. It is for this reason 
that Harry Guntrip, who was trained by Fairbairn, observes that 
introversion diminishes the capacity to love, and that a reversal 
of the regression renews this capacity.6 It is probably past the 
time I should have indicated my assumptions about the relationship 
between Shelley and Yeats. I believe that a number of the central 
poems of the Romantic period, including some of Shelley's major 
poems, represent attempts by the poet to free the capacity to love, 
which is a property of what I have called a deeper part of the ego. 
These romantic poems are not expressions of feeling, they are 
expressions of the desire to feel, the deep wish that is frequently 
discovered even in a pathologically regressed patient. One of the 
most often encountered defences of inwardness is intellectualization, 
whereby processes of thought act as a screen for the vulnerable, 
withdrawn emotions. One has only to think of the complicated but 
ubiquitous interplay of the "heart" and "thoughts" in the major 
romantic poems to see this at work. But what happens to the repressed, 
separated affective part of the self while the outer, everyday 
portion deals with the world in an essentially unlibidinal way? 
Observers tend to agree that it maintains relations to outer things 
in an imaginary way -- not the things but their images become 
so-called "internal objects" to which love becomes attached. 
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Let me set out, then, the way in which I view the changing 
relationship between Shelley and Yeats. During the early part of 
7 his career, as several critics'-- Bornstein, especially -- have 
noted, Yeats was delighted to find in Shelley a powerful representation 
of the intellectual ideal. Or as we might view this period, which 
would extend to shortly after 1900, Shelley served to strengthen and 
maintain the defensive structures in Yeats that helped to maintain 
the isolation and protection of a feelingful self. I will assume that 
you are familiar with the change in sensibility that Yeats underwent 
in the early part of this century -- at change he wrote about in the 
essay called Discoveries and in his autobiography. Briefly, Yeats 
recalls that he had earlier come to care for nothing but "impersonal 
beauty," and that he now recognized that his proper goal 
lay in seeking a Unity of Being that included earthly as well as 
intellectual elements. This seems straightforward enough, but of 
course it raises many questions: how accurate was Yeats's understanding 
of Shelley's "intellectual beauty"? why did Yeats part company from 
Shelley? how successful was Unity of Being as a means of fulfilling 
Yeats's aspirations? 
I think the psychological explanation helps somewhat in 
answering these questions, though it does not do so fully and of 
course does not help us to interpret all of the poetry. Given these 
limitations, let us see what it will do. The problems center, I 
believe -- and I think Bornstein would agreeS -- on the vicissitudes 
of the capacity to love and to feel. Shelley's essay On Love provides 
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a well-known image for the locus of the loving part of ourselves: 
this is "a soul within our soul that describes a circle around its 
proper Paradise which pain and sorrow and evil dare not overleap. 
To this we eagerly refer all sensations, thirsting that they should 
resemble or correspond with it. The discovery of its antitype,1I 
Shelley writes, "this is the invisible and unattainable point to 
which Love tends; and to attain which, it urges forth the powers of 
man to arrest the faintest shadow of that, without the possession of 
which there is no rest or respite to the heart over which it rules." 
Among the many fascinating aspects of these thoughts is 
that they already represent a split in the self, a remove to deep 
within of the affective part of the self. And yet Shelley tells us 
that this center of love, which he conceives as a soul within a soul, 
exists "within our intellectual nature." The translation of affect 
to idea here suggests the larger problem of the imaginary form of 
the kind of love Shelley discusses, for this is purified to such an 
extent that it can never be adequately represented by a real person 
any more than Yeats's image of Maude Gonne could be equalled by her 
reality. In Shelley's life Harriet and Mary quickly moved from 
idealized to actual woman, thus causing Shelley to turn to other 
women to satisfy the need for idealization. Maude Gonne's refusals 
to join Yeats, one might say, kept his idealization more consistent. 
But what is similar is the intrinsic opposition between intellectualized 
and actual love objects. 
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I am not implying that Shelley erred in this kind of love, 
for one has only to think of Alastor or the "Hymn to Intellectual 
Beauty" to realize how powerfully libidinized these objects were 
and how important to the existence of the poet. For one of the 
things we learn from the latter poem is that in addition to consecrating 
human thought with its own hues, Intellectual Beauty stabilizes 
Shelley's otherwise tempestuous existence: 
there is a harmony 
In autumn, and a lustre in its sky, 
Which through the summer is not heard or seen, 
As if it could not be, as if it had not been! 
Thus let thy power, which like the truth 
Of nature on my passive youth 
Descended, to my onward life supply 
Its calm to one who worships thee . 
Whom, SPIRIT fair, thy spells did bind 
To fear himself, and love all human kind. [74-81, 83-84] 
What I ~ suggesting is that we err if we construe this relationship 
to Intellectual Beauty as a sufficient solution to the problem of 
division. What does Intellectual Beauty actually provide for 
Shelley? It elides the present: there is only the past and the 
future ("As if it could not be, as if it had not been!") and the 
identity between the two brings "calm" and self-regard ("fear"). 
That Shelley longs for the "harmony" and sense of an admirable self 
that only the Spirit of Beauty brings implies an early experience of 
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maternal insufficiency that would lead to the kind of splitting or 
dissociation I have described. One can discern the effect of such 
insufficiency in Shelley's repeated desire to be absorbed into the 
idealized object, regardless of its specific identity. In discussing 
the Proven<;al Trouveurs, who in their verses "wrote of the delight 
which is in the grief of love," Shelley concludes that "it is 
impossible to feel them without becoming a portion of that beauty 
which we contemplate.,,9 This fusion is quite similar to Shelley's 
repeated references to a general absorption of the individual into 
the one mind or the one man: in the essay "On Life," for example, 
Shelley denies that his is the single, universal mind -- "I am but 
a portion of it." It is to this recognition, Shelley writes, that 
"the intellectual philosophy has conducted us. We are on that verge 
where words abandon us, and what wonder if we grow dizzy. 
I think it is this dizzying fusion, in which the self is drawn into 
an idealized entity, that represents one goal of Shelley's poetic 
quest. And it may also be, as Yeats noted in his essay on "The 
Philosophy of Shelley's Poetry," that this is the reason that Shelley 
identified the discovery of the idealized object and death, for fusion 
is a form of death, as is a regressive symbiosis. 
These may have been some of the underlying reasons for 
Shelley's commitment to intellectual beauty and intellectual 
philosophy. But to Yeats Shelley's example validated his own 
attraction to the beauty that would provide the inward freedom of 
faeryland or Innisfree, let us say, for the inwardness of the deep 
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heart's core. What I am referring to is also what Thomas Whitaker 
calls a desire in the early Yeats for "a transcendence of all 
limiting earthly form. ,,11 Yet ,yeats could have found such 
aesthetic idealizations elsewhere, and we might ask why he felt so 
strongly about Shelley in his early career. Several reasons might 
be advanced, but in the context I am developing I would say that 
Yeats sympathized with an air of exclusion that surrounds Shelley: 
by this I mean that Shelley at times seems to feel himself excluded 
from an active involvement in life. What, for example, does it 
mean to hear Shelley cry out that he has loved Intellectual Beauty 
"only" and "ever"? Among other things it means that he has found 
the love he speaks so eloquently of in the Defense -- a love that 
is the "sublimist victory over sensuality and force.,,12 Yet this 
sublime passion is less a sublimation than a compensation, and 
without integration this is only an intellectual victory, as if the 
sensuality and force of the parent were always a blocking element. 
The self that remains in opposition to idealization in Shelley --
as in the "little world of self" that opposes love in the Defense 
is usually merely a shell, the dry husk that remains when love 
has fled. Life has to be gotten through by this self, though only 
in the limited way that Yeats implies when (after de Lisle Adam) 
he says that our servants will do our living for us. The real 
covering cherub does not block the gates of paradise -- it blocks 
the gates of life, as though inspiration were always necessarily 
and inevitably insufficient. Yeats, after all, invented his 
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phantasmagoria partly to deny his own fear of living. As he writes 
in 1917, "when I came home after meeting men who are strange to me, 
and sometimes . . . women, I go over all I have said in gloom and 
disappointment. Perhaps I have overstated everything from a desire 
to vex or startle, from hostility that is but fear •• But when 
I shut my door and light the candle, I invite a Marmorean Muse. 
Yeats's great honesty here should not keep us from 
appreciating the depth of his fearful exclusion from men and women, 
much as Shelley sought to overcome sensuality and force. Early 
shocks to the affective ego create inhibitions, dissociation and a 
sense of outsideness that reflects a fear of involvement, as though 
the outer ego would be consumed by relationship. 
As we move into Yeats's middle and later periods we find 
Yeats adopting Unity of Being, daemonization and dramatic even 
violent -- characters as means of evading what he took to be 
Shelley's unwavering commitment to the intellectual philosophy. As 
Guntrip observes, the withdrawal of the affective ego inhibits the 
capacity to love. Yeats's antimonies or contraries seek to merge 
the affective and intellectual portions of the self so as to avoid 
the fates of Athanase and the Alastor poet. "The other self," 
Yeats writes, "the anti-self or the antithetical self ••. comes to 
those . whose passion is reality." The Daemon comes seeking its 
opposite, but only when the man has found "a mask whose lineaments 
permit the expression of all the man most lacks, and dreads." Did 
such a difficult unity resolve the problem of Yeats's identification 
with Shelley? Did Yeats find his way back to life? And did he 
misread Shelley in any event? These questions deserve fuller 
answers than I can provide here: We can say, though, that the 
adoption of a compensatory mask ironically parallels a commitment 
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to an intellectual philosophy. Both approaches distance and diminish 
an emotional self that is already interiorized and frail. Yeats 
writes that in ancient days the blind man became a poet in opposition 
to everything his inner self cried out for. This is Yeats's method 
as well, but it does not allow that childlike, vulnerable self to live 
it keeps it suppressed. We don't often hear in Yeats's poetry, 
powerful and compelling as it is, what Keats called "the true voice of 
feeling." The Yeatsean ideal of a poem "cold and passionate as the 
dawn" maintains a lack of integration. 
And yet this compensation and the intellectual philosophy 
are not exactly the same. Yeats sensed in Shelley what he may have 
feared in himself: a projected nightmare that was a corollary to the 
quest for an ideal. In the late essay "Prometheus Unbound," written 
in 1932, Yeats states that Demogorgon is the product of "that 
something which again and again forced him to balance the object of 
desire conceived as miraculous and superhuman, with nightmare." 
This is very close to a psychoanalytic explanation: Shelley's 
withdrawal necessitated a division between negative and idealized 
introjects -- that is, a difficult relationship forces the child to 
divide the image of the parent, which is then projected as nightmare 
or terror and idealized image. 
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In the Zoroaster passage in Prometheus (I, 191-207) the 
Earth ("a venerable mother") tells the god of a world beneath the 
grave where the "shadows" or shades of all of us live -- till death 
unites us. Structurally this is very close to Yeats's notion of the 
daemon or antiself, and one might propose that the antiself represents 
a swerve from Shelley's shades. But it is also disturbingly close 
to a characteristic dream of withdrawn patients -- the discovery of 
a dead child that is also themselves. That childlike part of the 
self is split off and deadened, and the genuine and ever present 
danger is that it will draw the rest of the personality to it, like 
a black hole, leading to greater withdrawal or suicide. I said before 
that Shelley served to strengthen the division between selves in the 
early Yeats; but the important defenses keep the personality from 
further regressing, and as if to preserve his own increased involvement 
in life Yeats rejected Shelley as one who only "sang of something 
beginning." If there is a swerve involved here it seems to have more 
to do with this fear for the self than with oedipal strivings. 
Nevertheless, I think that Yeats was wrong about Shelley, 
who I think clearly and strongly seeks to integrate the self. 
The great emphasis in Shelley is on the desire to love -- I am 
thinking among many texts of the young Shelley learning "to love all 
human kind" in the "Hymn"; of much besides Demogorgon in Prometheus; 
and of that extraordinary phrase in the Defense which states that 
poetry "compels US to feel that which we perceive," as fine an 
epitome of a major portion of the Romantic enterprise as we can find, 
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and one which if Shelley could have extended to the intellect would 
have been a reconciliation worthy of Prometheus. The need to love 
and the importance of feeling are both powerfully reflected in his 
writings; that Yeats did not recognize these along with the 
idealization-nightmare dyad implies h:ls own defense against 
identification. 
I have already suggested that Yeats's adoption of an 
antithetical poetic could not solve the need for self-integration, 
for if we invoke an opposite to ourselves, whose unity of being are 
we creating? Shelley had his terrors, but the dissociation of 
sensibility that Eliot wrote of can be seen even in such a grand late 
poem as "The Circus Animals' Desertion," in which the poet claims to 
still be a "broken" man, by which he means not only aged but 
incapable of combining Shelley and Diekens in one man. As Yeats 
enumerates his "old themes" in a vain search for a new one it is clear 
that what had been cathected in each ease was a dream, the "dream 
itself had all my thought and love": 
But what cared I that set him on to ride, 
I, starved for the bosom of his faery bride? 
The commitment to libidinized fantasy is so extraordinary in this poem 
that we should not fail to hear the horror when Yeats concludes that 
Now that my ladder's gone, 
I must lie down where all the ladders start, 
In the foul rag-and-bone shop of the heart. 
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All withdrawals are effected out of a fear of vulnerability and I 
think it is this that the disgust with the heart is masking and 
defending against. 
A different and more explicit fear informs "Cuchulain 
Comforted." We earlier noted Yeats's apparent sympathy for Shelley's 
sense of exclusion or ostracism as well as his own sense of social 
inhibition. This very late poem seems to suggest that the lifelong 
division between self and anti-self in Yeats persisted to the end. 
Cuchulain, you recall, is placed in a twilight world similar to 
Dante's inferno, where he meets Shrouds who inform him: 
'first you must be told our character: 
Convicted cowards all, by kindred slain 
Or driven from home and left to die in fear.' 
When we remember that Yeats wanted Maud Gonne to be "kindred of his 
soul" we may hear an acknowledgement in these lines that the need 
for such a version of kinship is itself fatal; and that the accurate 
image of the affective self is that it was early driven away and left 
in fear -- not to die in fear but to dissociate, in a radical defense 
that may seem like death and is not easily reconciled. 
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